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I n  Britain, as in the United States, rationing of health care is 
a fact of life and death. Some rationing is overt, such as the Stanford 
heart transplant program's decision not to accept very young or older 
patients.1 Some is disguised, such as day-to-day decisions in hospitals 
about "do not resuscitate" orders2 or the reported British reluctance 
to offer dialysis to older patients who might be a bit "crumbly."3 Some 
rationing takes the form of absolute barriers to care, such as patient 
selection criteria. Some involves the refusal to fund care, with the 
practical result that care is beyond the reach of those who cannot pay. 
Whether all should have access to at least a decent minimum of health 
care, and whether rationing can be justified against the background 
assumption that they should, are complex moral issues, which we 
shall not tackle directly here.4 Rather, our aim is to present two factors 
that are important for the implementation of a rationing policy to be 
justified, and to explore the extent to which these factors are realized 
in Britain. Our findings, that Britain falls short of these factors in 
some glaring ways, yet that rationing occurs, suggest that the ration­
ing that takes place in the National Health Service is not justified at 
the present time.
First, a word about what we mean by rationing. We use the term 
very broadly, to include any situation in which distributive issues are 
taken into account to decide who gets care.5 Thus, rationing occurs
when factors beyond the patient's interests or autonomy are figured 
into a treatment decision. Common examples of such factors include 
the patient's age (old or newborn) ,6 social status, employment his­
tory, ability to pay, and likely life span, or quality of life. To discon­
tinue care that merely prolongs the course of dying, and so will be of 
limited or no medical benefit, however, is not to ration in the sense 
with which we are concerned. To be sure, contrasts here are not 
sharp; quality of life can be so reduced, or life span so abbreviated 
that it is not in the patient's interests to continue care. The shift to a 
rationing decision occurs when considerations come into play about 
how resources could be used elsewhere—when the talk moves to 
how another patient might make better use of an intensive care unit 
bed.
Rationing decisions in this broad sense take place all the time. They 
are adopted as express social policy, such as limits on Medicaid 
eligibility in the United States, or the British decision to phase in heart 
and liver transplantation slowly.7 They take place on the level of 
individual patient care, too, as when a busy British general practi­
tioner devotes less than five minutes to a patient8 or an American 
hospital ethics committee is asked to consider issues in the allocation 
of hospital resources to patient care.9
Justifying Rationing
Whether it occurs on the level of social policy or the level of delivery 
of care to individual patients, at least two, and perhaps three, factors 
are important for the rationing of health care to be justified. The 
importance of these factors is sufficient for our critique of Britain, and 
we do not make any further claims about whether they are individu­
ally necessary or jointly sufficient for rationing to be justified. The 
factors are, first, that the decision to ration was made with the 
participation of those whose interests are at stake (or their proxies, if 
necessary); second, that it was made with awareness that rationing 
was at issue; and, finally, that those with interests at stake had 
alternatives available, at least to some limited extent.
These factors are important for several reasons. Access to health 
care makes a great difference to the opportunities people have, to 
their ability to live without pain or discomfort, and to life itself.10 Ill 
health can strike anyone, even those who take responsible care of 
their health. If ill health does strike, the financial consequences may 
be beyond the reach of even the deepest individual pocket or the 
most prudent individual efforts to buy insurance on the private 
market.11
The randomness of illness and the importance of health care to the
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quality of life have been taken by some as arguments against ration­
ing health care. In this chapter, we do not draw this inference, but do 
not thereby mean to suggest it is unjustified. Rather, we take the 
importance of health care, at minimum, as an argument for the 
opportunity to participate in a decision to ration. If the decision is to 
forego care because of its costs, those affected will be the individual 
patients; if the decision is a matter of social policy, they will be those 
who gain or lose access to care.
There has been recurring debate in Britain over the adequacy of 
British political institutions to respond to citizen concerns or to allow 
affected citizenry to become directly involved in administering pro­
grams such as the provision of health care. There are several ways in 
which such citizen participation might now take place. The tradi­
tional view of British political institutions is that Parliament fulfills 
two critical roles in translating popular preferences into public policy. 
First, by the doctrine of collective responsibility, the ministers of the 
government assume complete responsibility for the party's program 
and performance in office, thus permitting voters to judge, at the 
time of the general election, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
the governing party's performance and, at the same time, the merits 
of the opposition party's proposals. Second, by the doctrine of 
individual responsibility, the individual minister is held accountable 
for the actions of his or her ministry's civil servants. According to this 
doctrine, a misapplication of rules or the abuse of authority by a local 
health authority is ultimately the responsibility of the minister in 
charge. Vehicles such as question time enable the members of Parlia­
ment to question the appropriate minister about local incidents as 
though the minister were cognizant of them (although of course he 
rarely is; nonetheless, he is constitutionally and politically responsi­
ble for them). The implication of the doctrine is that serious errors in 
administration lead to ministerial resignation.
Most commentators writing on the contemporary British constitu­
tion would question the extent to which the doctrines of collective 
and individual responsibility continue to reflect political reality, let 
alone effectively serve the purpose of legislative oversight. Govern­
ments often modify and equivocate on their programs, and few 
ministers ever resign. Indeed, the doctrine of individual ministerial 
responsibility may serve to cloak the actions of civil servants, rather 
than to reveal them to public scrutiny, because questions are directed 
to ministers and away from civil servants.
The National Health Service (NHS) has not been immune from 
efforts at reform to find alternative institutional means to achieve 
greater public scrutiny of and participation in policy-making. One 
such reform was the 1974 reorganization of the Service, a reorganiza­
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tion that has undergone substantial subsequent modifications. The 
1974 reform created fourteen regional authorities responsible for 90 
Area Health Authorities, in turn, responsible for 199 District Health 
Authorities. These areal authorities were created largely to coincide 
with county boundaries drawn in a then recent local governmental 
reorganization. A stated goal of the NHS reorganization was to 
involve many more local authorities in the management of the NHS.
Along with this reorganization of the administrative structure, 
Community Health Councils (CHCs) were established for each health 
district. Their membership (of about 30 each) was drawn half from 
local authorities and half from local voluntary organizations and 
appointees of the regional Health Authorities. The objective of the 
CHCs was to represent the public to those who administer the NHS. 
It appears, however, that few members of the public even know of 
their existence. The CHCs are strictly advisory in their recommenda­
tions and are forbidden to organize nationally. Bates has argued that 
the CHCs, in spite of not being directly elected, have caused NHS 
officials to consider the interests of some patient groups that hereto­
fore have been neglected. But Bates does point out that the CHCs 
cannot or have not been willing "to set priorities for the needs they 
uncovered and state which services could be reduced to enable the 
new services to be developed."12 Most importantly, the efforts at 
oversight by either Parliament or by citizen bodies have been largely 
negligible in determining any sort of criteria for the allocation of 
scarce and expensive medical treatments. As discussed below, these 
allocative decisions have been the result of central budgetary deci­
sions rather than policy deliberation.
A second factor of importance in the justification of rationing is 
public knowledge that a rationing decision is at stake. John Rawls has 
suggested that the requirement that moral principles be public is a 
"constraint of the concept of right."13 He makes this suggestion 
because he believes moral principles are part of a public charter for 
social life. A community that acts on hidden moral principles lacks a 
shared moral life—and, not incidentally, is less likely to be one that 
justifiably claims the loyalty of its citizens.14 What Rawls does not 
bring out is the equally important point that those who are left in the 
dark about the moral principles of their community are, in a sense, 
second-class citizens. They do not know by what principles their 
community functions. Not knowing, they will try to change princi­
ples with which they disagree. For example, citizens who do not 
know that their society rations health care, either as a matter of 
expressed or tacit policy, will not be moved to institute public moral 
debate on the matter. The practical value of their ability to participate 
is thereby diminished.
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Moreover, those in the dark may easily be victimized by their 
ignorance. Whether intended or not, one effect of intentional secrecy 
is to make such victimization easier. No one has to face the pain of an 
identified victim, because the victims cannot identify themselves. It is 
much harder to tell a patient with end-stage renal disease that care 
would help him, but he cannot have it because society refuses to pay, 
than it is to appear to render a medical judgment that nothing can be 
done.15 In rationing situations, it is comfortable to hedge. Hedging, in 
turn, makes the rationing easier, because no one has to openly face 
the true anguish of the choice. It also leaves the patient passive, since 
he does not know that there is any point in even looking for 
alternatives.
There are certainly a number of ways in which British health care 
policy can be communicated to the public. Ministerial statements, 
both in and out of Parliament, convey information. For example, 
there has been discussion lately of plans to increase the numbers of 
renal and heart transplants in Britain. Question time in Parliament 
can be used particularly as a way to air grievances about the impact of 
policy. The Department of Health and Social Services also issues 
occasional circulars setting forth policy. What we question below is 
whether information about policy has been fully articulated, and 
whether members of the British public have been made sufficiently 
aware about how policy is translated into practice to appreciate 
important implications of the translation for individuals' lives. For 
example, it is one thing to have a publicly-stated policy that the 
availability of dialysis is based on medical criteria, and another thing 
to implement financing policies that increase the likelihood that 
nonmedical factors such as chronological age will play an important 
role in allocation.
The third factor that makes rationing easier to justify is the avail­
ability of alternatives. When scarcity is absolute, it may not be 
possible to combine a just health care system with full access for 
everyone to medically feasible alternatives. For example, if the num­
ber of transplantable organs is biologically limited, and the supply 
falls short of needs, a public system of allocation may be the fairest 
method possible. To allow some private access to suitable organs 
would be to diminish the public supply.16 The argument has been 
made that in any two-tier health care system, the presence of the 
upper tier threatens to undermine the quality of care available on the 
basic tier.17 If there are situations in which the availability of alterna­
tives does not threaten to undermine the quality of basic care, 
however, such availability makes rationing easier to defend. The 
individual who loses out on rationed care can seek other sources for 
care. If such other sources are legally but practically unavailable, most
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likely because they are too expensive, rationing is correspondingly 
harder to justify because of the ultimate finality of its effects on lives. 
If the alternatives are legally prohibited, rationing is harder to justify 
still to those who have the resources and would choose to purchase 
care with them. It is perverse comfort to tell such people that they 
may spend their resources on other luxuries but not on health, 
especially when their decisions to purchase health would not dimin­
ish the resources available to others.
In Britain, for those who can pay for them, alternatives to the NHS 
are legally available. Private insurance plans fund dialysis, for exam­
ple. Some organ transplants are funded privately. 18 And the ultimate 
step of going abroad is always a possibility for those with the means 
to do so. It should be emphasized, however, that these alternatives 
are beyond the financial reach of the majority of Britons. Moreover, if 
British patients are unaware that care is medically possible because 
allocative decisions are conveyed to them as medical judgments, even 
available alternatives may be left unexplored.
The NHS: Setting Rationing Policy
The motivating force in the development of the National Health 
Service was equity in the distribution and provision of medical 
services. Before the Second World War, there was widespread con­
cern that the state-sponsored health insurance of the Edwardian 
Liberal governments had not gone far enough in providing health 
care for the less well off. Enforced migrations to rural areas during the 
bombings of the Second World War brought home to many Britons 
the existing sharp geographical differences in medical services and 
their costs. Some urban areas offered state-assisted medical care at 
little cost, while most rural areas were without. The war had gener­
ated, for many Britons, a strong commitment to equality in the sense 
that social services—notably health but also housing and education— 
ought to be made available to all, regardless of station or income.
The overriding concern with equality of access for all to medical 
services has been apparent throughout the nearly forty years of the 
Service's operation. Fairly regular investigations are conducted to see 
if, indeed, treatment has been equitably distributed by class and by 
region. Yet, there remain significant regional variations in the alloca­
tion of resources and persisting sharp differences in life expectations 
among social classes. For example, British unskilled manual laborers 
have a two-and-one-half-times greater chance of dying before reach­
ing retirement age than British professionals. Data on self-reported 
morbidity, particularly chronic illnesses, parallel those on mortality.19 
These inequalities have troubled many proponents of the Health
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Service, for whom the core value of the NHS is expressed in the 
personal experience of one of its most formidable defenders, the late 
R.M. Titmuss:
Among all the other experiences I had, another which stands out is that 
of a young West Indian from Trinidad, aged 25, with cancer of the 
rectum. His appointment was the same as mine for radium treat­
ments—10 o'clock every day. Sometimes he went into the Theratron 
Room first, sometimes I did. What determined waiting was quite 
simply the vagaries of London traffic—not race, religion, colour or 
class.20
The British commitment to equality has been expressed principally 
in terms of class and geography. Except in some early statements 
about the importance of the Service to the old and the young, the 
commitment to equality has not been expressed in terms of age. Class 
is indirectly related to age in so far as the elderly may be found in 
greater numbers among the poor. Beyond this indirect relation, 
however, the NHS has not emphasized age equity, and as we shall 
see, it appears that age rationing has taken place in practice within 
the NHS.
The wartime experiences of the population had included rationing 
of many resources on criteria independent of market allocation. The 
advocates of state-provided health care argued that medical treatment 
in postwar Britain should be severed from the marketplace, but 
delivered more effectively than under the old system. The many 
government reports that preceded the Act establishing the NHS went 
beyond treatment of illness by calling for promotion of the positive 
health of the nation.
The recognition that there would be increasingly hard choices to be 
made in allocating medical treatment was obscured in the political 
reality that allowed the National Health Service to come into existence 
in the postwar years. At that point, the potential—and expense—of 
medical care to improve life chances seemed likely to lie in better 
access and in the new wonder drugs, not in capital intensive, ex­
tremely expensive therapies. Medicine has, of course, been a rapidly 
changing field for decades, but what stands out is that many of the 
advances today are associated with complicated and expensive surgi­
cal techniques, in contrast to the 1940s when the emphasis was on 
new drugs, such as penicillin, that appeared to have vast capacities to 
cure disease.
What might be described as a second, more recent tradition in the 
assessment of medicine in Britain has been criticism of the role of 
technology. British medicine has been faulted for what is described as 
the undesirable import of American technological medical practices
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with substantial investment in procedures to prolong life. The criti­
cism is directed to transplants, both organic and mechanical, that 
seem to absorb significant resources and, in the view of some critics, 
to overestimate the prolongation of life while undervaluing the qual­
ity of life. The 1980 Reith lectures of Ian Kennedy are an example: 
"The other task doctors in hospitals are performing is that of calling 
upon more and more complex and expensive technology to respond 
to situations in which, when one looks at the general overall picture, 
there is usually little that can be done. To use the metaphor of the 
mechanic, the tyre can be patched, but even so, it is permanently 
weak." Kennedy's criticism of technological medicine is combined 
with a concern that it represents misplaced priorities:
My second point is that, put baldly, certain services should not be 
offered until matters of greater priority are dealt with. There are 
perfectly respectable ethical theories that, in the context of harsh 
choices such a those we face now (and always as regards resources), 
allow for conduct that will benefit the larger worthy number even if 
this inevitably means others may suffer. One example was the decision 
in the second World War in North Africa that only those who on 
recovery would be able to fight again should receive scarce penicillin.21
This attitude that medicine should provide measured care instead of 
an all-out onslaught on serious ailments appears to be born out of 
newer doubts about technology's costs and beliefs in the limits of 
medical practice. This tradition may, as Aaron and Schwartz sug­
gest,22 remove some, but by no means all, of the pressure on physi­
cians to engage in expensive procedures.
The great concern for equality and the sense of the limitations of 
medical treatment are the context in which the National Health 
Service has operated. Of equal significance to the formation of British 
health care policy has been the institutional development of the NHS. 
Until quite recently, the NHS placed the management of health 
services in the medical community. The compromise that developed 
between the Labour government of Aneurin Bevan and the British 
Medical Association during the establishment of the NHS was that 
doctors would be viewed as independent contractors who would 
retain autonomy in the performance of their services. In Britain, as in 
the United States, this is often described in terms of the inviolability 
of the doctor-patient relationship. By the same token, consultants (as 
we describe them, specialists) were given control over the administra­
tion of hospitals. In effect, a tripartite organization was set up 
composed of hospital services, community services (local health 
services), and family practitioner services. In the studies of the NHS, 
"the National Health Service was bound to be a 'doctor's service' 
much more than a 'patient's service.' ' /23
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Of all the actions of the postwar Labour government, perhaps the 
most distinctive in organization was granting the medical profession 
the power to administer the National Health Service. The compro­
mise was probably politically necessary to get the Service established. 
Nonetheless, the aim of the NHS was medical treatment for all, 
regardless of condition, and citizen as patient was not given a role in 
the direction of the NHS save in the form of Parliamentary review.
The 1974 reorganization of the Health Service, described above, 
was in part motivated by concern to increase participation at the local 
and lay levels. Local areal authorities were formed to improve coordi­
nation in the provision of services. The creation of the Community 
Health Councils was intended to involve members of the community 
in assessing the conditions under which medical treatment takes 
place. In practice, however, the Councils do not seem to have been 
major consumerist enterprises, but rather to have functioned as 
organs supporting NHS objectives.24
A far more potentially serious institutional modification of the NHS 
took place eight years later, with the introduction, in 1982, of a 
management council for the NHS. The Conservative government of 
the 1980s sought to introduce professional managers and tighter 
central control over the NHS. They also sought consideration of some 
forms of privatization in the provision of medical services. The 1982 
management reform was seen by the Thatcher government as a 
crucial step towards cost effective decision-making in the NHS. Some 
of its apparent implications are discussed below.
Parliamentary review of the NHS has taken the form of the remark­
able budgetary control correctly depicted by Aaron and Schwartz. 
The lid on medical expenditure—although not perhaps as apparent 
within Britain as it is to students of comparative health care costs— 
has meant that while the NHS has moved from about 3.2 percent of 
the GNP to about 5.7 percent in thirty-five years, it remains relatively 
inexpensive by the standards of other industrialized nations. The 
pattern in Britain for decades has been limited budgets given to the 
medical profession to determine, within those parameters, the alloca­
tion of resources for medical treatment. This allocation has been 
complicated more recently by the expense of innovations in medicine 
both at the diagnostic level and at the level of treatment. In the face of 
the changing nature of medical practice, the budgetary limitations set 
by Parliament pose increasing dilemmas for practitioners.
The key qualification of the hope of the NHS in the 1940s to sever 
the connection between market considerations and medical treatment 
was the role of the practitioner. In Britain, the need for medical 
treatment is determined in the first instance of patient care by the 
general practitioner (GP). The GP performs the central gatekeeping
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role in the Service by first diagnosing the patient and then determin­
ing the type and extent of the treatment (if any) that the patient 
should receive. Most importantly, the GP determines if the patient 
should be sent to a consultant or to a hospital for further treatment.
Traditionally, British GPs have made decisions about patient care 
paternalistically, based on their assessment about what would be best 
for their patients. Patients are passive and deferential to authority. 
This passivity may be reinforced by British class structure and atti­
tudes of resignation to illness. It is likely also reinforced by the 
gatekeeping system itself, under which the GP, not the patient, 
makes decisions about whether and which specialist to consult.25 The 
legal standard in Britain for informed consent to treatment, for 
example, is what a reasonable physician would disclose; British 
courts have rejected as inappropriate for British medicine the stan­
dard of some American jurisdictions, that the physician must disclose 
what the reasonable patient would want to know .26
The concerns raised by this intersection of GP autonomy and 
paternalism begin with observation of treatment rates. A survey of 
disorders with known responsive procedures, found in the popula­
tion at large in Britain, reveals that patients in Britain ailing from 
heart and kidney disease or hip problems appear to receive fewer 
transplants and hip replacements per million than patients in other 
advanced industrial nations.27 Within Britain, moreover, there are 
wide regional and age disparities in rates of treatment.28
A central illustration of the dilemma confronting contemporary 
British medical practice is the introduction of dialysis for the treat­
ment of end stage renal disease. By the early 1970s, British civil 
servants had become conscious that the new technologies in treat­
ment of renal failure were fairly reliable, lifesaving, and expensive. 
Rapid advances in medical technology had generated what has been 
characterized as a "technological imperative." The new procedures 
were adopted, but incrementally, and it soon became apparent that 
the United Kingdom's rate of treatment was below that of other 
nations. The United Kingdom also relied more heavily on less expen­
sive, nonhospital-based therapies such as home dialysis. According 
to Halper, the low treatment rate falls almost entirely upon those over 
the age of 45 or suffering complicating diseases.29
The willingness of British physicians to accept and work within 
such a limited program may have reflected a tradition of dealing with 
limited resources. It is important to emphasize that this tradition 
antedates the formation of the NHS. British hospitals were in short 
supply and often seriously outmoded by the 1930s. The war may 
have reinforced the notion of making do with what was available. 
Moreover, as Kennedy's Reith lectures seem to imply,30 physicians
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coming out of the Second World War may have continued to use the 
wartime criterion of triage: who can contribute productively to the 
struggle? Thus, in the 1950s, certain therapies in Britain were given to 
those who possessed a prior history of gainful employment and 
seemed likely to continue to work. Rehabilitation services and cata­
ract surgery, for example, were, in the main, restricted to patients 
under 65.31 This criterion of social usefulness, if understood in con­
ventional terms, can adversely affect access of the elderly to treat­
ment. It appears inferentially from the distribution of care such as 
dialysis that such an understanding may have occurred. This under­
standing is a particular irony since at the outset NHS policy state­
ments had stressed the care of both the elderly and the young.
Halper32 suggests some additional factors that may have contrib­
uted to the informal rationing system that appears to have developed 
among British physicians. Physicians' committees called to consult 
with the Ministry of Health about the introduction of dialysis were 
eager to get the program started and did not question its modest 
beginnings. The Ministry's interest in cost control coincided with the 
specialists' emphasis on establishing centers of excellence at major 
teaching hospitals. When responsibility for funding renal units was 
turned over to regional health authorities in 1971, it was done within 
the context of overall financial restrictions. Within this context, gen­
eral practitioners, who in any event rarely encounter patients with 
end-stage renal disease, have not developed networks of experience 
in patient referrals, and may continue to work on outmoded medical 
assumptions about patient suitability for dialysis. Finally, perhaps 
because of discouragement and overwork, there are comparatively 
few nephrologists within the United Kingdom.
The inferential nature of the contention that British physicians 
employ nonmedical criteria in the allocation of dialysis must be 
emphasized. Despite the statistics about distribution of treatment, no 
criteria have been officially articulated by Parliament, the Department 
of Health and Social Services, or regional or local health authorities on 
how to allocate treatment for end-stage renal disease. Decisions not to 
treat those over 45, or those with complicating conditions, have not 
been made as formal public policy. The dialysis program was es­
tablished on very limited grounds, and it appears that physicians 
allocated care within these limits on a more or less informal rationing 
basis. There is no written policy as to who should receive medical 
treatment in Britain. Indeed, British writing on health policy suggests 
an interesting paradox: a good deal of concern for the elderly, but the 
willingness to resort to an age criterion in times of hard choices.
This paradox may have emerged because the traditional purposes 
of the Health Service were equality between classes and geographical
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region, not age cohorts. As we have suggested it also seems likely 
that institutional structure has played an important role in the appar­
ent resort to age criteria. The preservation of the autonomy of the 
physician-patient relationship, in the light of limitations on resources, 
has allowed (or perhaps forced) physicians into establishing their 
own criteria for determining who is to receive treatment, and physi­
cians appear to have been influenced by triage considerations.
The complexity and risk of the tight budgetary limitations and the 
failure to articulate criteria for the allocation of health care in a state 
system are apparent in increasing confrontation between some pa­
tient-oriented movements and the NHS. The British Kidney Patient 
Association (BKPA) claims that between 2000 and 3000 people die 
yearly from renal failure, and that some portion of these deaths are 
unnecessary because treatment facilities are too few in number and 
too unevenly distributed. To dramatize this claim, the BKPA has 
taken a patient who was refused treatment, and paid for his treat­
ment privately. The Association plans to present the bill to the NHS 
for reimbursement.
The problem of being refused treatment grows in importance the 
older a patient becomes; so does the ethical dilemma and the poten­
tial legal dilemma faced by physicians. In the view of one commenta­
tor, Diana Brahams, the present policy of emphasizing the finite 
amount of money available and leaving decisions about how to 
allocate it to local authorities leaves the physician failing in his duty if 
he tells his patient he is untreatable, when he is indeed treatable but 
simply not going to be treated because of a lack of facilities. Brahams 
suggests that the National Health Service Act of 1977 imposes a duty 
on the Secretary of State for Social Services to provide treatment, and 
that the failure to treat a treatable patient may allow judicial review 
and an order for a mandamus to force the Secretary of State to carry 
out his duty to treat.33
Despite efforts by advocacy groups such as the BKPA, it is by no 
means apparent that we are about to see a significant rise in recourse 
to the law by British patients. Historically, British patients have not 
opted for legal action, nor indeed have they employed the NHS- 
established procedures for complaints. Explanations vary for the 
limited use of the complaints procedures. Some blame the formality 
of the procedures for the passivity of patients. It is apparent that 
while both patient and doctor can elect not to deal with each other 
and opt for other lists, British patients rarely change physicians 
except by geographical movement. In effect, the British physidan- 
patient relationship is a remarkably quiescent one in which the 
patient has come to expect to deal with a single medical authority
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over the course of much of his or her lifetime. This situation places 
immense responsibility on the physician, who knows in practice that 
the patient appears to have no real alternative source of medical 
advice, and limited prospects for a realistic exit from the medical 
system. Physician autonomy and Parliamentary cost concerns have 
interacted in Britain to produce a situation in which this responsibility 
is not fully exercised on the patient7s behalf. Patients, however, may 
well remain unaware of the failure.
This historical pattern of decision-making for treatment policies in 
the NHS can surely be criticized. That criticism should not obscure, 
however, the institutional potential for devising national and explicit 
criteria for the treatment of patients requiring costly procedures. An 
illustration of this potential is the Thatcher government's change in 
NHS managerial strategy. The new strategy is controversial and, 
indeed, may have been imposed for what might be considered the 
wrong reasons, to hold steady or cut back health care costs. A 
national health care management board has been established with an 
aggressive, interventionist style of national management that seeks to 
establish efficient health care planning. Day and Klein argue, "The 
latest round of manpower targets shows that the Department's (De­
partment of Health and Social Service's) long term concern with 
inputs is undiminished by its more recent interest in outputs."34
In large measure, however, the changes in NHS management 
reflect a new managerial approach in British government. Day and 
Klein argue that there is an effort for all governmental organizations 
to have a clear view of their objectives and the means to assess and 
measure performance in relation to these objectives. Organizations 
are to have well defined responsibility for making the best use of their 
resources, particularly money. The NHS, since 1948, has delivered 
services in response to local priorities of clinicians and health authori­
ties as much as to the explicit directives of central political authorities.
Parliamentary accountability has not really existed for the NHS. 
The new management plan has potentially sweeping implications for 
the NHS of imposing a clear sense of national objective. Such a 
system could establish Parliamentary determination of what the NHS 
should be about. Presumably, such efforts as the issuance in 1983 of 
fourteen performance indicators to the fourteen regional authorities 
and the now 192 local authorities have given the opportunity for 
national comparisons. This emphasis on performance appraisal could 
generate pressure to establish differentiated criteria for the allocation 
of expensive therapies. The driving force for such explicit develop­
ment of criteria would be to account for sharp regional differentiation 
in the allocation of therapies at present, and to permit Parliament to
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come to terms with the de facto criteria for allocation that presently 
exist. Such a system of national objectives and strict accountability 
could lead to a sharp departure from the existing system of decentral­
ized autonomy. By contrast, this potential for institutional change is 
not apparent in the decentralized American system.
The National Health Service was established with the goal of 
equalizing geographical and class access to medical care. It is ironic 
that the Service's institutional structure of physician control has 
discouraged public articulation of treatment goals. The result has 
been that as the Health Service developed, and costs of treatment 
increased, physicians have apparently tended to employ implicit 
rationing criteria. From the data about rates of treatment, it may be 
inferred that these criteria focus on likely social contribution, and age 
in particular.
Unfortunately, the use of these criteria was not developed as 
articulated public policy. To be sure, the increasing concerns of 
successive Parliament and governments to limit expenditures have 
been articulated public policy. The problem is not that people in 
Britain receive fewer hearts per se, or indeed, that the political 
authorities have determined that use of resources to increase such 
operations is unwise. Our concerns are whether or not there has been 
an articulation of the criteria actually used in the delivery of health 
care to British patients, either in the political arena, or on the level of 
individual patient care. Under the GP gatekeeping system, it is 
questionable whether knowledge of alternatives is presented to the 
patient or his designated guardians in a way that allows the opportu­
nity for informed decisions about treatment. How general budgetary 
limits were to be translated into patient care has been left up to 
physicians, for the most part. The public, and individual patients, 
remained relatively unaware that rationing decisions were made 
because of budgetary limitations. These decisions were especially 
hard on the elderly. British policy articulated the need to cut health 
care costs, but did not articulate the bases on which hard choices 
were to be made.
Recent institutional reforms in the NHS appear to have created a 
structure within which such allocative criteria can be explicit, publicly 
responsible policy. Until they become so, however, the age rationing 
that has developed within the NHS must remain morally suspect. 
The lesson to be drawn from Britain to the United States is not simply, 
as Aaron and Schwartz say, that there are hard choices to be made. 
The other equally important lesson is that it matters institutionally 
how these choices are made and are communicated to those who 
must live or die with them.
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